Why Ahmed al-Sharaa's U.N. Debut Matters

When Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa addresses the U.N. General Assembly this week, it will be another milestone on his improbable journey. For years, he was known only as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the shadowy leader of Syria’s al-Qaeda branch and a man with a $10 million U.S. bounty on his head. Flash forward to Sunday, when he arrived in New York City by jet and disembarked wearing a smart suit. He has since been fêted by the Syrian diaspora and even former CIA director Gen. David Petraeus. But while Sharaa’s U.N. debut will further solidify recognition of his government, the situation back in Syria is shaky. The international community now welcoming Sharaa should push him to adopt genuinely inclusive policies, not encourage him to impose control on a still divided country. Only 10 months ago, the government of President Bashar al-Assad controlled most of Syria. But an offensive led by Sharaa’s Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in late 2024 saw the Syrian military’s defenses collapse. Rebels seized Damascus on Dec. 8., and Assad fled to Moscow. Sharaa had suddenly become Syria’s de facto president, ending a half century of Assad family rule. Read More: How Our Digital Museum Is Uncovering Assad’s Crimes in Syria Sharaa’s new government was met with a warm welcome abroad. Countries dispatched ministers to Damascus to re-establish ties. The Trump Administration was initially cooler on Sharaa, apparently taking cues from an Israeli government skeptical of Syria’s new leader. But Saudi Arabia’s crown prince brokered a meeting between Trump and Sharaa in May, after which Trump called the Syrian leader a “tough, attractive guy.” The Trump Administration became an enthusiastic backer of Sharaa’s government. Sharaa’s first months in power saw him prioritize external legitimacy. He infrequently addressed the Syrian public, even as he visited foreign capitals and received a parade of dignitaries in Damascus. The strategy seemed to pay off. Sharaa won broad international recognition of Syria’s post-Assad political system, and, just as crucially, secured sanctions relief from the U.S. and others that Syria badly needs to recover and rebuild. But at home, the stability and legitimacy of Sharaa’s government still seems unsettled. His government has consolidated its authority, but in ways that have not been fully participatory and inclusive. Sharaa was named president by acclamation at a January “Victory Conference” of rebel commanders, where he announced the dissolution of armed factions. His government organized a national dialogue conference the next month, but the conference was brief—only a day and a half—and short on real, in-depth debate. In March, his government unveiled an interim constitution for a planned five-year transition. The document accords extraordinary, largely unchecked power to Sharaa. Now the government is organizing parliamentary elections, but the electoral process will be indirect and tightly controlled; a third of parliament’s seats will be appointed by the presidency. Sharaa divorced himself from al-Qaeda years ago. Yet he still implicitly represents a Sunni Islamist political project. Sunni Arabs make up a majority of Syria’s population, but the country is also home to numerous religious and ethnic minorities, including Alawites, Christians, Druze, and Kurds. Many minority communities—in addition to Sunni Arabs who do not share Sharaa’s sociocultural outlook—are uncertain of their future in this new Syria. And real power remains closely held among a small circle of Sharaa’s associates and former Tahrir al-Sham members. Sharaa has limited material benefits he can distribute to the broader Syrian public. The country’s economy is still wrecked, after years of war and crushing sanctions. His government has touted large foreign investments, but they will only produce results for ordinary Syrians over the medium and long term. And Syria is still divided, territorially. Within government-held areas, Damascus still has limited real control over former opposition factions. And Sharaa’s attempts to extend government control over the rest of Syria have alienated minorities on the country’s periphery. Government-aligned forces put down an uprising on the Syrian coast in March, but in the process massacred 1,500 Alawites. When government forces and allied paramilitaries tried to seize Druze-majority Suweida governorate in July, Israel intervened militarily to force them to withdraw. Suweida remains largely outside Sharaa’s control, and local leaders now demand autonomy. Northeast Syria, meanwhile, is still held by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. Implementation of a March agreement to integrate the region into the rest of Syria has stalled. Some among Damascus’s supporters now fear an “alliance of minorities” arrayed against Syria’s new government. Sharaa can likely count on the international community’s continued support. U.S. envoy to Syria Tom Barrack, in particular, has emerged as a leading booster of Damascus, repeatedly emphasizing that there is “no plan B” to Sharaa. Yet Barrack’s support for Syria’s central government—or just “Syria,” as he has called it—in negotiations with groups on the country’s margins reportedly encouraged Damascus to attack Suweida. This week in New York, Sharaa will be making his case for further sanctions relief and for international support for a unified Syria—a message likely to be warmly received at the U.N. General Assembly. But the international community ought to be careful. Syria is still divided, and real legitimacy remains contested, even now. If countries support a single factional project to unify Syria—without pressing Damascus to account for its missteps to date—they risk new instability and bloodshed.