Why India Is Embracing the Taliban

The Taliban evokes bitter memories in India. The Islamists were seen as complicit in India’s worst plane hijack in 1999 and the 2008 attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul, which killed several Indian citizens, including two senior diplomats. It is for these and other reasons that the Afghan Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s trip to Delhi is so remarkable. Muttaqi, who is still on the U.N. sanctions list, had to get a travel exemption to arrive in India last Thursday for a week-long visit. India referred to him as the Afghan foreign minister, allowed him to hold press conferences at the Afghan embassy premises in Delhi that are still manned by officers of the previous Western-backed government, and had its foreign minister S. Jaishankar share the stage with him. Delhi also plans to reopen its embassy in Kabul soon. But as Muttaqi went about a public relations blitz in India and held talks with Indian officials, deadly clashes erupted along the Durand Line border between Pakistan and Afghanistan in recent days. The timing alongside Muttaqi’s visit to India—Pakistan’s arch-rival—underscores the complex India-Afghanistan-Pakistan geopolitics at play. Why is Delhi reaching out to Kabul? India has maintained relations with the Taliban ever since it seized power in Kabul four years ago. But a series of regional developments has led to the unprecedented change in India’s policy toward the Taliban we are seeing today. The military conflict between India and Pakistan earlier this year, China’s active and growing support for Pakistan, Russia’s lukewarm response to that war despite its historical defense ties to India, and Washington’s recent embrace of Pakistan have created a sense of unease and claustrophobia in Delhi. Read More: Why American Presidents Love Pakistani Strongmen Like Asim Munir Delhi has few friends or trusted partners left in a large swath of the Indian subcontinent, from the Rann of Kutch in the Gujarat border to Kashmir in the north, China to its north-east and South Asian states such as Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, and Bhutan. Afghanistan is important in such a geopolitical context, and the Taliban appear to be willing to play ball. Yet Delhi’s outreach to the Taliban has faced severe criticism given its human rights record. The uproar caused by the initial press conference that excluded female journalists was just one reminder of this. Notwithstanding this criticism, though, there is still a growing view within Delhi that foreign policy should be pragmatic and driven by interests rather than ethical considerations. Delhi has been consistently prioritizing cold interests over all else—engaging with the junta in Myanmar, refraining from openly criticizing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, engaging both Iran and Israel, and getting closer toward recognizing the Taliban as Afghanistan’s official government. The new thinking in Delhi is that it should work with whoever holds power in a country. Welcoming Muttaqi to Delhi reflects this approach. The Delhi-Kabul-Islamabad balance of power What makes the current India-Taliban engagement more consequential is the Pakistan factor. Without that, Delhi might not have engaged the Taliban as eagerly as it is doing now. There are three competing impulses from three capitals. Islamabad fears a closer defense and security partnership between two unfriendly states located on either side of it. Kabul wants to hedge against its deteriorating relationship with its former patron Islamabad, which accuses the Taliban of harboring a separate but allied group that has carried out deadly attacks inside Pakistan. Delhi is motivated by revisiting historical connections with Afghanistan, securing potential economic and trade access to Central Asia, and establishing a friendly presence on Pakistan’s western flank with potential strategic benefits. These competing impulses have resulted in distinct strategies. Islamabad wants to keep a wedge between Delhi and Kabul or, at best, control the Taliban. Kabul wants to boost cooperation with an India that is also at odds with Pakistan, and as the Taliban continues to seek formal international recognition as the government of Afghanistan. Delhi seeks to engage whoever is in power in Afghanistan as a counterbalance to Pakistan. In short, Delhi and Kabul are thinking that “the enemy’s enemy is a friend,” while Islamabad sees a strategic partnership between countries on its flanks as detrimental to its interests. Given these complex three-way dynamics, Delhi will likely continue to upgrade ties to the Taliban regime, and support its efforts to gain greater independence from Pakistani influence. Conversely, although Pakistan once played a significant role in assisting the Taliban and therefore helping it return to power in Kabul, an Afghanistan with more international friends to turn to is not in Pakistan’s interest, as it could undermine Islamabad’s control over Afghan affairs including the 1,600 mi. international border that it hopes to renegotiate. All crossings between Afghanistan and Pakistan were shut on Sunday following ongoing clashes. In that sense, by hosting Muttaqi, Delhi may have deepened the growing rupture between Afghanistan and Pakistan that was on display during the recent border clashes. Islamabad is now more likely to consider Delhi’s growing friendliness with the Taliban to harm Pakistan’s interests a real possibility, regardless of Delhi’s actual intentions. Among the general Indian public, however, the growing ties between Delhi and the Taliban is raising eyebrows. But Delhi will continue to try to thread the needle between these concerns and its desire to forge closer regional partnerships at Pakistan’s expense.