The Case for Trump’s Ukraine Peace Plan

The release of a 28-point plan last week to end the war in Ukraine has generated heaps of commentary—and controversy. Part of that is outstanding questions over its authorship, which Reuters reported on Wednesday drew from a Russian paper submitted to the Trump Administration last month. Following a diplomatic scramble from Ukraine and Europe this week, a 19-point plan far more favorable to Kyiv has been developed. But unfortunately the revised plan, based on a European counter-proposal, stands no chance of being accepted by Moscow. The stakes are enormous. If the peace talks fall apart, a war that has claimed hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian and Russian lives, will grind on. And there is a real risk that Ukraine’s military position will worsen if not collapse; the U.S. Army Secretary Daniel P. Driscoll reportedly warned Kyiv as much last week as Russia stockpiles enough long-range missiles that could deliver a knockout blow. The warning comes amid ongoing concerns about Ukraine’s manpower shortages and Russia’s seemingly endless ability to sustain the war. Read More: Ukraine Can’t Win the War It’s important to stress that while the original draft plan entails some painful concessions, it does not represent Ukrainian “capitulation” to Russia’s war of aggression. Compared to the Russian hope at the start of the war for the total subjugation of Ukraine, and the past 400 years of Ukrainian history, it could indeed be called a qualified Ukrainian victory. Almost 80% of Ukraine will remain free, independent, heavily-armed, and with an accepted path to join the E.U. The Trump Administration should urge Ukraine and Europe to accept the original plan with only limited changes. On the crucial issue of Ukrainian NATO membership, the original plan read that “Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to include in its statutes a provision that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future.” In the European counter-proposal, this is replaced by “Ukraine joining NATO depends on consensus of NATO members, which does not exist.” This is indeed true, and saves the Ukrainian and European governments from the politically difficult and embarrassing task of reversing a longstanding position. But it seems very unlikely to satisfy the Russian government, which believes the West had previously given informal promises not to expand NATO eastward that were broken. On the equally crucial issue of NATO troops in Ukraine, the original plan read simply that “NATO agrees not to station troops in Ukraine.” The European counter-proposal reads that “NATO agrees not to permanently station troops under its command in Ukraine in peacetime.” This leaves open the possibility of a European “reassurance force” provided by NATO members but not under formal NATO command. But Moscow has repeatedly ruled this out. And while Britain and France have pledged to put boots on the ground as part of a multinational force, most others haven’t, so there are not enough troops. Such a force would be desperately vulnerable, while not really strengthening Ukraine. Is it worth throwing away the chance of peace for this empty project? The original plan would see $100 billion in frozen Russian assets invested in U.S.-led reconstruction efforts, with America receiving “50% of the profits” and Europe pitching in an extra $100 billion. The European counter-proposal reads that “Ukraine will be fully reconstructed and compensated financially, including through Russian sovereign assets that will remain frozen until Russia compensates damage to Ukraine.” But while the (very Trumpian) 50% American cut is on the face of it quite outrageous, what really matters is that funds are made available for Ukraine’s reconstruction. If that can be done not just with Russian money but with Russian agreement, then this should be accepted if the alternative is a breakdown of talks. Other issues are essentially minor. The original plan, for example, caps the Ukrainian army at 600,000 personnel, but that is larger than the British, French, and German armies combined, and is a much bigger force than Ukraine could hope to maintain in peacetime. Such a force could deter Moscow from resuming an extremely costly war—one that would sacrifice all the benefits from rapprochement with the U.S. In the end, the greatest deterrent by far is that the Russian invasion has involved such huge losses for gains that have fallen far short of Moscow’s initial aims. There is, however, one point in the original plan that Ukraine really cannot accept as it stands: Ukrainian withdrawal from the roughly 10% of Donbas it still controls. This would admittedly be a moral rather than practical loss for Ukraine. This area represents barely 1% of Ukraine, and most of its population has already fled. The original plan would see the eastern region demilitarized, and Ukraine would be able to build new defensive lines, so the military loss would not be severe. Above all, those who advocate a rejection of this flawed, but ultimately workable framework should ask themselves whether there is any realistic chance that Ukraine’s military position will improve if the war goes on. The evidence suggests otherwise. This may be the last chance to achieve real peace, and one that can avoid more years of war that may leave Ukraine in no better place.