Why Europe Can't Tame the Far Right

The 2015 migrant crisis still hangs over Europe. The more than 1.3 million migrants—particularly from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq—who claimed asylum that year has been a boon for grievance-driven European populism and its most talented practitioners. The upshot is a cultural and economic anxiety that has transformed the continent’s political landscape. And yet, the first 10 years of the far right’s rise have amounted to a “yes, but” decade. In Germany, the Alternative for Germany party has steadily expanded its regional and federal influence, but all other major parties still treat political collaboration with it as taboo. In France, the populist Marine Le Pen has shown she can reach the second round of presidential elections, but has been unable to claim victory. In Italy, Giorgia Meloni in 2022 became the first anti-immigrant populist to win a big European election, but her strong cooperation with Brussels and consistent support for Ukraine has helped her defy far-right stereotypes. In the U.K., Brexit champion Nigel Farage might now be polling in first place, but that’s still some distance from winning the next general elections in 2029. Centrist governments have also emerged this year after elections in Germany and Romania, despite a rise in support for the far right. Meanwhile, the Dutch government, led by the far-right Party for Freedom, collapsed in June, and the Austrian Freedom Party has failed to form a ruling coalition despite winning elections in September. For now, E.U. institutions are holding up fine. Pro-E.U. parties continue to dominate politics in Brussels and the risk that Euroskeptics can create gridlock remains low. In the European Parliament, the centrist coalition that backed Ursula von der Leyen for a second term as European Commission President will hold together despite growing tensions. In the European Council, just four of 27 members (Hungary, Slovakia, Italy, and the Czech Republic) are led by nationalist governments. But Brussels has finally managed to limit the ability of far-right governments to shift E.U. policies, and Meloni and Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala cooperate closely with von der Leyen. All that said, the next few years will offer big opportunities from Europe’s anti-migrant, Euroskeptic far right. Questions about economic resilience and stubbornly high prices remain the main sources of economic anxiety for voters. Even as immigration policies have been tightened and the number of asylum seekers in Europe has fallen, the long-term presence of migrants amid stagnating economies will continue to feed voter anger. The economic pressures applied by Donald Trump’s trade war compound public frustration with their current governments. In short, there’s no reason to believe far-right parties and politicians will fall silent or fail to score future political gains at the expense of beleaguered centrist establishments. Two years from now, far-right parties will have their best-ever shot at capitalizing on mounting voter anger with national elections in France, Italy, Spain, and Poland. In France, though Le Pen is currently barred from seeking the presidency following an embezzlement conviction in March, her National Rally party could finally sweep to power in the heart of Europe. In Italy, Meloni will face pressure to adopt more Euroskeptic positions on high-profile issues in the run-up to elections. In Spain, the center-right Popular Party will likely lead the next government but could be forced to welcome the far-right Vox into a coalition for the first time. In Poland, steadily eroding support for Prime Minister Donald Tusk could pave the way for a return of right-wing nationalist parties to power there. The far-right Karol Nawrocki has already prevailed in the June presidential elections, and he will take office in August. Taken together, these developments would shift the balance of power in the populists’ favor, transforming how the E.U. defines its values and its interests. The potential fallout—whether on the rule of law, security and economic matters, internal borders, dealing with an expansionist Russia, or even the future of the E.U. itself—remains grave.